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People’s Bank of China 
We are very glad to see our central bank colleagues present at this seminar on developing corporate 
bond markets in Asia. It is our great pleasure to co-host this event with the BIS, and we are particularly 
pleased to have Malcolm D Knight, the BIS General Manager, joining us to share his insights on the 
seminar topics. In meetings to be held today and tomorrow, colleagues from around the region and the 
world will share their experiences with us. 
I am also pleased to take advantage of our position as a co-host to talk about corporate bond market 
development in China thus far and, in particular, the urgent need to accelerate progress. 
I. Macroeconomic  environment 
The Chinese economy has enjoyed GDP growth of approximately 9% per annum in recent years - with 
the strong momentum likely to continue in 2006 - while CPI inflation has been kept in check. 
The abundant liquidity in the economy contributes to low interest rates and subdued inflation. 
Moreover, the savings rate is noticeably high. As a result, the M2/GDP ratio is high compared to other 
economies, and may well approach 200% in 2005. Commercial banks have continued to play a 
dominant role in channelling savings into investment. In contrast, financing through the equity market 
remains small, while the bond market accounts for less than 10% of such intermediation. 
China’s bond market appears to be very large, but in proportion to GDP, bond market financing is still 
insignificant. Of bonds outstanding, some 40% are government bonds, while the rest are corporate 
bonds issued by both financial and non-financial institutions. Furthermore, the value of financial 
institutions’ bonds outstanding is seven or eight times that of non-financial corporate bonds. 
Currently, the bond market in China is divided into an over-the-counter (OTC) market and an 
exchange market. The OTC market is basically an interbank market where there is little regulation, 
and institutions are free to participate and strike deals at the prevailing market prices. Since its 
establishment in 1997, the OTC market has expanded to include both financial and non-financial 
institutions, and currently the issues of more than 4,000 non-financial corporations are traded there. 
Meanwhile, we are also trying to develop our short-term corporate bonds and commercial paper in the 
OTC market. We are very eager to learn from the experience of other countries as to how to allow the 
bond market to play an important role in economic development. 
II.  Problems in corporate bond development 
China’s underdeveloped corporate bond market has distorted the financing structure in the economy, 
which poses a threat to financial stability, as well as to social and economic development. Setbacks 
and mistakes had their roots in the specific circumstances of the past. In particular, in the early days of 
China’s economic transition, central planning still played a more important role than market forces. In 
2003, however, the third Plenum of the 16th Communist Party of China Central Committee called for a 
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greater role for direct financing through establishing a multi-tier capital market system, and through 
encouraging the growth of institutional investors. Only by thoroughly understanding the problems and 
mistakes of the past can we find more effective solutions. The following is a list of serious mistakes 
committed initially during the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Even today, some of these mistakes may still 
be impeding the development of the corporate bond market in China. 
1) The administrative allocation of quotas for issue size and number of issuers was mandated by the 
central government to provincial and lower-level governments. 
2) Administrative allocation of quotas was often used as a relief measure for financially distressed 
enterprises. 
3) The absence of a credit rating system made it impossible for investors to obtain a clear idea of 
risks. 
4) There was a lack of information disclosure to investors, due to i) inadequate accounting and 
external audit standards and ii) lack of regulatory emphasis on proper disclosure by issuers as well as 
prudent analysis by investors. 
5) Administrative pricing of corporate bonds and price controls failed to reflect risks, thereby 
preventing effective risk management by issuers and investors. 
6) Authorities required bank guarantees for corporate bond issuance and still do so today. Since 
issuance quotas were administratively allocated and prices controlled, and neither information 
disclosure nor credit ratings were available, bank guarantees seemed to be the natural solution. 
However, once guaranteed by a bank, the product was no longer a standard corporate debt but, 
rather, akin to a high-yield deposit at a commercial bank. 
7) Bond issues were targeted at retail rather than institutional investors, who were capable of risk 
assessment. 
8) Effective market discipline was not established. Market forces can discipline both the issuance and 
trading of corporate bonds as investors exercise their judgment in the choice of products - thereby 
giving them the final say on issue conditions, prices and consequences of default. Lack of effective 
market discipline can lead to a recourse to administrative means, which can give rise to a series of 
problems. In addition, in order for the OTC market to play a dominant role, a proper trading mode 
should be established to ensure proper assessment of counterparty risks and pricing flexibility. 
9) Investor education was not sufficient. To a large extent, many investors used to treat corporate 
bonds as just another savings deposit product. Whenever a default of corporate bonds occurred, they 
would turn to government agencies and demand redemption by underwriters. Moreover, the protection 
given by local governments to bond investors undermined the incentive for them to evaluate the risks 
involved. 
10) The current Bankruptcy Law did not provide investors with effective liquidation as a form of 
recourse in the event of default. In China, the residual assets - and even the issuer - could often 
simply disappear without going through legal procedures. Although we have been working hard on a 
new bankruptcy law, the current one does not provide adequate protection for creditors. 
11) The underwriter’s role was not properly defined. Underwriting and redemption typically came under 
the umbrella of central planning and administrative intervention. Furthermore, the underwriter was 
considered liable when the issuer failed, an arrangement that blurred distinctions between the 
underwriter, sales agent and redemption agent. 
12) Administrative intervention was even stronger in cases of corporate issuer default. The default of a 
corporate issuer was not dealt with according to market principles; rather, for reasons of social 
stability, the underwriter would be requested to issue bonds on its own to meet the obligations of the 
corporate issuer - with the consequence that the liability of the default issuer was transferred to the 
underwriter. The problems of some securities companies undergoing liquidation or restructuring were 
partly attributable to the burden they had to shoulder for the defaulted corporate issuers.  
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III. Possible  solutions 
Thanks to our own lessons from the past as well as those drawn in other economies, we can find 
effective solutions to our problems. First, we have to move from a strategy based on central planning 
to one based on market forces. If the practices of quota allocation, administrative approval and 
government intervention were to continue, the prospects for the bond market would be dismal. 
Furthermore, the old-fashioned mindset that harks back to central planning must be put aside when 
we analyse what has gone wrong. It is unfortunate that some analysts attribute the derailing of bond 
market development to non-fundamental factors. Therefore, it is helpful to hold in-depth discussions to 
understand these questions on an occasion like today. 
Second, we need to get the logic right. It is important that corporate bond issues should target the right 
investors and trade on the right trading platform. We have to start with Qualified Institutional Borrowers 
and OTC markets, so that institutions with strong analytical and risk management capabilities can play 
a bigger role. This will also facilitate streamlining of administrative approval and control because these 
qualified institutional investors rely mostly on information disclosure and market discipline, rather than 
on the judgment of the regulatory authorities. This in turn will also make guarantees by commercial 
banks unnecessary. Furthermore, institutional investors are better able to detect default risks, and are 
more resilient when such risks do materialise. The government does not need to worry too much about 
them. 
Third, we should spare no effort in strengthening institutional arrangements and improving the financial 
eco-environment, to build on the progress already made. Our accounting standards are being brought 
into line with best international practice; requirements on disclosure and oversight have been 
enhanced; and the Bankruptcy Law is being amended with a view to better protecting creditors. In 
addition, we are trying hard to foster the domestic rating agencies necessary for bond market 
development, although these rating services may grow only slowly over time. The basic policy is to 
allow international rating agencies to set up joint ventures to provide high-quality services. Such a 
move is likely to be quite controversial due to the traditionally strong protectionist mentality of the past; 
however, we now have to accelerate progress towards international accounting standards and rating 
services. 
Fourth, efforts are needed to improve government efficiency, and break bureaucratic segmentation in 
market organisation, service, infrastructure and supervision. Institutional and organisational 
impediments to market building and bureaucratic friction have hindered the development of China’s 
corporate bond market - and we are still facing a legacy from the past in this regard. Different 
authorities are responsible for approving bond issuance, monitoring issuing conditions, and regulating 
the OTC and exchange markets. In addition, differences in market infrastructure make cross-market 
transactions difficult. These are problems we will have to deal with in the process of developing the 
bond market. 
IV.  Questions to be answered 
There are a number of other problems we still face in developing corporate bond markets, ones for 
which there may be no easy solutions. 
First, China shares with a number of Asian economies some similar macroeconomic conditions, such 
as high savings rates and abundant liquidity. Both of these macroeconomic conditions tend to militate 
against the development of a corporate bond market. Indeed, corporations with good credit standing 
do not have strong motivation to issue bonds as they can easily obtain loans from commercial banks 
at low interest rates. To develop the corporate bond market, adequate market liquidity may be 
desirable. However, if bond buyers are mainly institutional investors and financial institutions with too 
much liquidity on hand, they may not be very interested in trading in the secondary market. 
Second, should we allow foreign participants to enter the domestic bond market? In China, the bond 
market remains relatively closed. Since the renminbi is not a convertible currency, we have not 
allowed foreign institutions access to the market. Recently, though, we did allow both the Asian 
Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation to issue local currency bonds in the 
domestic market, and have plans to open up the market further. We recognise that there are still 
impediments in both practice and mentality to promoting open markets. But eventually, we will open  
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the domestic bond market to foreign investors, foreign issuers and foreign financial service providers 
such as credit rating agencies. 
Third, in China there is constant debate on whether the bond market should serve mainly the financing 
needs of large corporations or small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). One point of view is that 
easy access for large corporations to the capital markets would increase competition in financial 
intermediation and thereby encourage commercial banks to lend to SMEs - as has happened 
elsewhere in the world. To improve asset quality and reduce non-performing loans, commercial banks 
currently tend to lend to large and well-run enterprises. There is nothing wrong with this approach. 
However, once large and well-run enterprises develop a preference for financing through bond 
markets, commercial banks will get the message and divert more of their resources to study SME 
financing business, and may even establish their own SME departments. 
Another approach is to focus on the development of a corporate bond market for SMEs, as they are 
critical to employment and social and economic stability. However, such bonds are likely to be high-
yield and high-risk. Without sufficient preparation, a properly-qualified investor base and/or an 
adequate pricing mechanism, an SME debt market is likely to be problematic. Indeed, is it feasible to 
launch non-investment-grade bond products at such an early stage of market development? This is 
really an issue of how to sequence corporate bond market development. Should we develop a low-
grade market after a high-grade corporate bond market is fully developed or foster the growth of both 
at the same time? We need to do more research on these issues. Many countries do not yet have a 
mature SME bond market. Even in the US, the collapse of the high-yield “junk” bonds in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, as symbolised by the downfall of Michael Milken, might have both positive and 
negative impacts. I think this episode in the bond market history deserves careful study. We will also 
watch closely the experiences of other countries, especially those of our neighbours. On the other 
hand, we have to consider whether their experiences are applicable to China. 
So, we have many questions in our minds. We sincerely hope that in the meetings to be held today 
and tomorrow, we can have fruitful discussions on these issues and share experiences candidly. 
Certainly, my PBC colleagues will benefit enormously from this seminar. 